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ABSTRACT 
Mathematical diagrams are frequently used in contemporary mathematics. They are, however, 
widely seen as not contributing to the justificatory force of proofs: they are considered to be 
either mere illustrations or shorthand for non-diagrammatic expressions.   Moreover, when 
they are used inferentially, they are seen as threatening the reliability of proofs.  In this paper, I 
examine certain examples of diagrams that resist this type of dismissive characterization. By 
presenting two diagrammatic proofs, one from topology and one from algebra, I show that 
diagrams form genuine notational systems, and I argue that this explains why they can play a 
role in the inferential structure of proofs without undermining their reliability.  I then consider 
whether diagrams can be essential to the proofs in which they appear. 
 




Diagrams have been in the mathematician’s toolbox since antiquity.  In ancient Greece, 
diagrams reflected the mathematics of the time, which dealt mostly with magnitudes, 
geometric figures, and proportions.1  The wide variety of diagrams available to us now reflects 
our own mathematical concerns.  Diagrams aid mathematicians in representing not only 
 
1 Cf. (Netz 1998; 1999; Ferreirós 2016, Ch. 5). 
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geometric figures, but also topological objects and structural relations.  Figure 1 shows a 
familiar geometrical diagram, a topological diagram, and an algebraic diagram.2 
 
          
(a)        (b)           (c) 
Figure 1. Three Diagrams 
 
Despite the fact that they are common tools of mathematicians, diagrams have been 
understudied by contemporary mainstream philosophy of mathematics – which focuses mostly 
on foundational issues and on very general metaphysical and epistemological questions.  
Typically, they are conceived of as, at best, superfluous illustrations and, at worse, dangerously 
idiosyncratic representations – ones that are helpful at times in amplifying our understanding, 
but also capable of leading us astray.  In an important recent book, John Burgess gives voice to 
this type of suspicion: 
 
 
2 Respectively, they are the diagram associated with Proposition I,1 of Euclid’s Elements (which shows how to 
construct an equilateral triangle on a given segment), a diagram of the trefoil knot (the simplest non-trivial knot), 
and a commutative diagram expressing a relation between groups. 
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Some [diagrams] are surely no more essential to the proofs in whose midst they appear 
than the illustrations that accompanied many Victorian novels on first publication were 
essential to the literary value of those works. Other diagrams may play a more 
important role, especially perhaps in those types of abstract algebra where what is 
called “diagram chasing” is ubiquitous; though even here, the kinds of diagrams that are 
chased seem only to abbreviate information that could be put, more cumbersomely and 
in a way less easy to take in, in words.  (2015, 98) 
 
My aim in this paper is to address this form of skepticism about diagrams and to do justice to 
their use in contemporary mathematical practice.  While I concede that some visual 
representations in mathematics are used as mere illustrations (even if they often play a 
significant heuristic role and thus are significantly different from the illustrations figuring in 
early Victorian novels), I nonetheless contend that this characterization hardly exhausts all such 
forms of visual representation in mathematics.  In other words, while conceding that some 
diagrams are redundant devices that enhance understanding in pedagogic and research 
contexts alike, I argue that 
 
A) other diagrams do not serve an illustrative function and, on the contrary, form 




B) there is a plausible conception of proof according to which diagrams are not just 
abbreviations for more cumbersome non-diagrammatic displays but are in fact essential 
to those proofs. 
 
In order to make the case for these claims, I discuss examples from two different domains in 
which diagrams are frequently used in proofs: low-dimensional topology and homological 
algebra. 
Donald Davidson once said that a picture is “not worth a thousand words, or any other 
number.  Words are the wrong currency to exchange for a picture” (1978, 47).   I show that 
words are also the wrong currency to exchange for a diagram.  In order to appreciate the 
effectiveness of diagrams, it is not enough to consider their informational content and how 
such content could be put into words.  We have to consider how the articulation of that 
content (i.e., the organization of the content in the constitutive features) matters in practice.  
This can be done, for instance, by evaluating how it facilitates extracting information, carrying 
out specific inferences, and performing calculations – all functions that mathematicians 
generally recognize and accept. 
In Section 2 and 3, I argue that practitioners sometimes think in and with diagrams in 
ways that reveal those diagrams to be essential.3  In Section 2, I focus specifically on diagrams 
that are not illustrations.  I spell out specific conditions that diagrams must meet to count as 
 
3 Elisabeth Camp (2007) makes a similar claim with respect to maps. 
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elements of genuine mathematical notational systems.  In Section 3, I consider diagrams that 
are not abbreviations of longer non-diagrammatic expressions. I show that there are plausible 
criteria of identity for proofs such that diagrams can play an essential role in proofs.  There is an 
analogous debate in the realm of poetry.  The so-called “heresy of paraphrase” is the thesis 
according to which a poem cannot be paraphrased (or translated).  “Poetry is what gets lost in 
translation,” wrote Robert Frost.  Something similar applies to diagrams.  Like poems, diagrams 
can be transformed into linguistic displays.  And, like poems, they cannot be translated.  In a 
phrase: inter-transformability does not imply inter-translatability.  In Section 4, I summarize my 
results. 
 
2. DIAGRAMS THAT ARE NOT ILLUSTRATIONS 
The use of diagrams is one of the (previously neglected) topics in the philosophy of 
mathematics that has recently begun to receive sustained attention.4  The literature is now rife 
with detailed case studies of the uses of diagrams both in contemporary mathematics and in 
various historical periods – from Euclidean geometry to ancient China, knot theory, and the 
study of C*-algebras5 – but tend not to address epistemological issues from a general 
perspective.6 That is my goal here. 
 
4 See (Mancosu 2008; Ferreirós 2016; Carter 2019b). 
5 See, for example, (Manders 2008), (Chemla 2018), (De Toffoli and Giardino 2014), and (Carter 2017), respectively. 
6 Notable exceptions are (Giaquinto 2007) and (Carter 2019). 
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It is uncontroversial that diagrams can serve as powerful heuristic tools – tools that help 
us discover new propositions and amplify our understanding.  What remains controversial, 
however, is whether diagrams can play a distinctly justificatory role.  Indeed, since the end of 
the 19th century, diagrams have been regarded with outright suspicion by mathematicians and 
philosophers alike: the worry is that certain diagrams and visualizations can lead us astray.  
Though there are some cases in which this accusation is justified, for example in encouraging 
the idea that we did not have to bother proving the Jordan curve theorem7 or when geometric 
diagrams are not used rigorously and lead to over-generalizations, in other cases it does not 
apply.  In what follows, I use two examples to show that diagrams can contribute to the 
justificatory force of a proof. 
 
2.1 TOPOLOGICAL DIAGRAMS 
Let’s start by considering diagrams of topological surfaces (i.e., two-dimensional manifolds).  
The Möbius band is the simplest non-orientable surface.  It is usually represented either as a 
sketch of an object in space (Figure 2(a)) or as an arrow diagram (Figure 2 (b)) – ignore the red 
interrupted line for now.  In the latter, the two vertical arrows have to be interpreted as gluing 
instructions: we have to imagine stretching the square and twisting it in space to align the 
arrows and identify them.  Imagining this process (or implementing it in a physical model made 
 
7 This and similar points are mentioned in (Hahn 1980, 93). The Jordan curve theorem might seem to be an obvious 
result, but it actually turns out to require sophisticated mathematical machinery in order to be proven. 
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of paper), we obtain something like Figure 2(a) – the arrows can then be erased since they are 
now internal to the surface.   
 
 
(a)                              (b) 
Figure 2. The Möbius band 
 
Consider the following question:  Which surface do we get if we cut the Möbius band 
along its core (indicated in the two representations by the interrupted red lines)?  Likely, Figure 
2(a) will not help since our ability to imagine transformations in three-dimensions is typically 
very limited and not especially reliable.  We could use a paper model of the Möbius band and 
see what happens when we cut along its core with a pair of scissors.  Alternatively, we can 
imagine cutting and pasting the arrow diagrams, creating the diagrammatic argument8 in Figure 
3.   
 
 
8 With diagrammatic argument, I mean an argument in which diagrams play a prominent role. In our case, the 
argument consists in manipulating diagrams according to specific rules.  A famous diagrammatic argument from 
ancient times is the one deployed by Socrates in Plato’s Meno (81e-86c). The problem there is to construct a 
square with double the area of a given square – this can be done by a sequence of steps in which we manipulate a 
diagram in a way that is not dissimilar to the cutting and pasting method presented here; for an in-depth 




PROPOSITION: Cutting the Möbius band along its core gives rise to a cylinder.  
PROOF 
 
Figure 3. Cutting Möbius band 
 
The first step consists of cutting along the red dotted line.  In order to conserve the 
original gluing instructions, we introduce the double arrow convention.  In this way, we 
indicate which side of the first piece must be attached to which side of the second and 
in which direction.  The second step consists of gluing the double arrows.  To align the 
arrows, we flip the second piece.  The third step is not a transition but a simplification.  
It consists of erasing the previously used gluing instructions and reshaping the rectangle.  
The final diagram is a rectangle with two sides identified in the same direction. It is a 





This is a simple proof of a simple result.  But there is a caveat.  It is a proof only if the 
diagrams and diagrammatic transitions are interpreted correctly.9  Cutting and pasting is not 
(only) an intuitive terminology to guide us in imagining diagrammatic transformations.  These 
two operations can be cashed out in precise topological terms: gluing corresponds to forming a 
quotient space, and cutting is the inverse operation of gluing.10  The notation formed by arrow 
diagrams is a perspicuous diagrammatic notation that lets us carry out mathematical 
operations in an intuitive way.  Moreover, it tracks relevant topological properties.  For 
example, from Figure 2 we see that any band with an odd number of half-twists is also a 
Möbius band; see Figure 4.   
 
Figure 4. Möbius band with three half-twists 
 
The number of twists is not an intrinsic property of the Möbius band, but one that derives from 
the way it is embedded in space.  Abstracting from the particular embedding is useful in certain 
circumstances, but it hides how embeddings change with the various transformations.  For 
 
9 See (De Toffoli Forthcoming) for a general analysis of when this is the case. 
10 Roughly, quotient spaces are spaces in which certain points are identified – in the case under examination, the 
sides with corresponding arrows are identified. 
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example, the previous argument does not show that cutting the standard Möbius band along its 
core yields a twisted cylinder. 
I called the argument in Figure 3 a “proof.”  It could be objected, however, that it not a 
genuine proof but merely an exercise in applying transformations on a specific diagram.  Fair 
enough.  As you can see in the following theorem, arrow diagrams generalize and can be used 
to prove substantive results: 
 
Theorem 1. Classification of Surfaces. Any closed connected surface results from gluing 
the sides of a polygon according to one of the two gluing instructions in Figure 5 – which 
are represented by a label (and a color).  The pattern on the left corresponds to 
orientable surfaces, while the one on the right non-orientable surfaces.  
 
  (a)                                  (b) 
Figure 5. Classification of closed connected surfaces 
 
ONE STEP OF THE PROOF 
I report in Figure 6 just a step of a proof appearing in a graduate textbook in algebraic 
topology (Massey 1991, 23).  The zig-zagging convention introduces generality.  It 
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indicates that any combination of arrows could be positioned in its place.11   The general 
strategy of the proof consists in showing that any collection of arrow diagrams 
representing a closed connected surface can be transformed into one of the two 
configurations in Figure 5.12   The step in Figure 6 is representative of the technique 
used.  It starts with a diagram containing two pairs of alternating arrows going in the 
same direction.  It proves that such a diagram can be transformed (without altering the 
surface it represents) into one with two adjacent pairs of arrows following the pattern in 
Figure 6(4) – which is a fragment of the pattern in Figure 5(1).  Let’s see how. 
 
 
Figure 6. A step in the proof of the classification theorem - from (Massey 1991, 23) 
 
In order to go from (1) to (2), we cut along c and glue along b.  The next two diagrams 
are equivalent. Figure 6(2) shows that b is now internal to the diagram. Figure 6(3) is 
 
11 Another diagrammatic proof is John Conway’s Zero Irrelevancy Proof or “ZIP proof” (Francis and Weeks 1999), in 
which similar diagrams are cut and glued with zippers. 
12 The proof thus assumes that we can start with some arrow diagrams.  This is equivalent to saying that surfaces 
can be triangulated (Massey, 1991, 14). 
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obtained by erasing b and introducing the internal arrow d as a new cutting instruction. 
Figure 6(4) results from cutting along d and gluing along a. 
QED 
 
2.2 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS OF ARROW DIAGRAMS 
Let us pause briefly before tackling the second mathematical example.  I want to draw out the 
main differences between the two representations for surfaces13 introduced above: arrow 
diagrams and sketches.  The latter are evocative, pictorial representations of three-dimensional 
objects.  Arrow diagrams are instead topological diagrams with precise mathematical 
conventions.  Diagrams have two central characteristics that pictorial sketches do not have: (i) 
they satisfy well-formedness conditions, and (ii) they are subject to precise rules of 
manipulation. 
Let us first look at the syntax of arrow diagrams. I limit the discussion to closed 
connected surfaces.  I will thus consider arrow diagrams formed by single polygons with all 
edges paired – the results can be easily generalized to non-connected surfaces.  The primitive 
objects are digons (i.e., polygons with just two sides) with oriented arrows.  As illustrated in 
Figure 7, there are just two possible basic diagrams, B1 and B2.  As a matter of fact, the arrows' 
direction is not relevant per se; what counts is only whether the arrows are oriented in the 
same or opposite ways.   
 
 
13 I am assuming that a surface can be triangulated. 
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Figure 7. Digons 
 
All other arrow diagrams can be obtained from these two basic diagrams, B1 and B2, by 
adding couples of oriented edges.  The set 𝐷 of well-formed arrow diagrams is the smallest set 
such that: 
 
1) B1 and B2 are in 𝐷. 
2) If the arrow diagram P is in 𝐷, and the arrow diagram P’ is obtained from P by adding 
two matching oriented edges, then P’ is in 𝐷. 
 
In order to obtain P’ from P, we add two matching oriented edges, either with the same or with 
opposite orientation.  We can position each of them in the place of a vertex.  They can, 
therefore, be positioned one after the other or separated by one or more pre-existing edges. 
Figure 8 shows how we can add a pair of oriented edges to B1, the first digon in Figure 
7.   There are four possibilities, corresponding to the choices of (i) whether the arrows are in 
the same or different direction and (ii) whether we insert the arrows one after the other or in 




   
   
Figure 8. Adding Two Matching Oriented Edges 
 
The next step would be to add two additional oriented edges to one of the configurations 
above.  This time there are ten different ways to do that. 
In general, a polygonal arrow diagram is a polygon with directed edges with labels to 
mark the pairing that results from a finite number of applications of the recursive definition 
above. Two figures represent the same arrow diagram when there is a bijection taking edges to 
edges that preserves labels, directions, and adjacency relations. 
Now to their semantics.  A polygonal arrow diagram represents a closed (i.e., without 
boundary and compact) connected surface.  Surfaces are two-dimensional manifolds.  That is, 
topological spaces that are locally indistinguishable from the Euclidean plane.14 
 
14 A closed connected surface is a 2-dimensional topological space in which (i) every point lies in an open set 
homeomorphic to the Euclidean plane (e.g., a disc minus its boundary) and (ii) for distinct points x and y 




Arrow diagrams represent surfaces as quotient spaces of disks in the plane (all polygons 
are, in fact, topologically equivalent to circles).  In order to specify precisely how to obtain such 
quotient space, we can give intrinsic coordinates to each directed edge Ei as follows: 0 at the 
tail endpoint, 1 at the head endpoint; taking the length of Ei as unit, for each point p on Ei 
between the endpoints assign t to p, where t (between 0 and 1) is the distance of p from 0 – 
see Figure 9.  Notice that the bottom-left vertex is now labeled 1, but will be labeled 0 if 
conceived as the starting point of the vertical left edge (all edges are going to be identified).  If 
E1 and E2 have matching labels, gluing the edges is, for all r such that 0 £ r £ 1, identifying point 
r of E1 with point r of E2.  
 
Figure 9. How to identify to edges 
 
Given an arrow diagram, for each point p not on an edge, we identify p with itself and 
nothing else; for each point p on an edge, we identify p with itself and with q, where p and q 
are on paired edges and have the same coordinate.  All the vertices are going to be identified.  
The relation x ~ y (x is to be identified with y) is an equivalence relation.  We thus get a partition 
of the polygon P into a set of ~ equivalence classes, i.e., sets of the form {y Î P: x ~ y}.  
These ~ equivalence classes are the set-theoretic representatives of points of the 
surface S represented by the polygon P.  A topological surface S is a set S of points together 
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with a set of subsets of S, which are the open sets of the surface. Which subsets of S are the 
open sets of S?  Let g be the function that sends each point p of the polygon P to the ~ 
equivalence class to which it belongs, that is, g(p) = {y Î P: p ~ y}.  A subset U of S is open in S if 
and only if g-1(U) is open in P, (where a set of points of P is open in P if and only if it is the 
intersection of P with an open set in the Euclidean plane in which P is embedded).  This is the 
standard definition of quotient spaces. 
The two digons B1 and B2 in Figure 7 represent the sphere and the projective plane, 
which is a non-orientable surface (and therefore it cannot be embedded in space).   The 
diagrams in the first line of Figure 8 represent the torus (that is a closed orientable surface of 
genus 1) and the Klein bottle, which is a non-orientable closed surface.  The diagrams in the 
second line of Figure 8 can be reduced to B1 and B2 by gluing the left and top arrows together. 
 The last thing we have to show to establish the soundness of the proof passage of 
Theorem 1 is that the cutting and pasting operation leaves the represented surface invariant.  
To cut along a segment E running between two vertices, say v1 and v2, is to (i) give E a direction, 
say from v1 to v2, (ii) produce two new diagrams from the parts of the cut diagram on either 
side of E, which (a) preserves the edges of the pre-cut diagram with their labels and 
orientations, and (b) gives to each new diagram a new edge (created by the cut) which is a copy 





Figure 10. Cutting along an internal segment 
 
We can then glue the two diagrams along another pair of matching edges, in this case O1 and 
O2, see Figure 11.   
 
 
Figure 11. Gluing along an edge 
 
Notice that the two new edges produced by cutting along E must later be glued together again 
to obtain the surface without boundary to be represented.  Gluing the edges E1 and E2 simply 
restores E and the local region around it in the arrow diagram before cutting along E.  So the 
surface to be represented cannot be changed by cutting and pasting. 
 Let me now turn to another operation.  Surfaces admit the operation of connected sum.  
For example, performing the connected sum of two tori, we obtain a double torus. Intuitively, 
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starting with the two surfaces, we subtract from each of them an open disk and then glue along 
the newly formed boundary circles; see Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12. The connected sum of two tori 
 
This operation corresponds to combining two arrow diagrams together.  We insert one diagram 
on a vertex of the other.  For example, in Figure 8 and Figure 13 we see how to connect two 
diagrams representing the torus – we imagine opening up the first diagram at the bottom right 
and the second diagram at the top left and then joining the two together to get the diagram 
showed in Figure 14.  
 
 





Figure 14. The diagram of a double torus 
 
The system formed by arrow diagrams is both sound and complete with respect to its 
interpretation.  Each well-formed diagram corresponds to a closed connected surface, and each 
closed connected surface (that can be triangulated) corresponds to a well-formed diagram.  
That is, a topological space is a surface if and only if it can be represented as a well-formed 
diagram.  Performing the cutting and pasting manipulation and the manipulation corresponding 
to the connected sum, we always obtain other well-formed diagrams representing a surface. 
 
2.3 DIAGRAMMATIC NOTATIONAL SYSTEMS 
We saw that sequences of diagrams can be parts of proofs.  This is because we can mentally 
manipulate them in ways that correspond to specific mathematical operations. These 
manipulations are cognitively simple and can be performed reliably by mathematicians.  
Crucially, arrow diagrams do not pose the risk of overgeneralization that is typical of geometric 
diagrams.  Overgeneralization arises when a specific diagram is used to obtain general results.  
For instance, when we sketch a triangle to prove a result about all triangles – how can we be 
sure that we are not relying on features of our particular representations that are idiosyncratic 
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to it?  With arrow diagrams we do not have this problem because they form a sound system 
with respect to their interpretation.  No visible variable features of drawings of an arrow 
diagram, apart from the number of edges, their pairing and directions, are topologically 
relevant.  Additional variations, such as variations of internal angles and of length-ratios of 
diameters, are geometrically relevant – they do not matter for arrow diagrams, but they are 
relevant to geometric diagrams.15 Hence, we are more liable to make a false geometrical 
generalization (than a false topological generalization) by relying unwittingly on a visible feature 
of a diagram that is not shared by everything in the range of generalization. 
Second, arrow diagrams can be easily generalized.  We saw that we can represent non-
orientable surfaces, that is, surfaces that cannot be embedded in space.  For example, the 
second diagram in Figure 8 represents the famous Klein bottle.  Furthermore, arrow diagrams 
representing surfaces generalize to solids.  Henri Poincaré (1900) explains how to obtain three-
dimensional spaces by identifying the faces of solid polyhedra.  For example, the Poincaré 
homology sphere (i.e., a three-manifold whose homology groups are the same as the sphere, 
but it is topologically different from it) can be obtained by gluing the opposite sides of a solid 
dodecahedron as in Figure 15. 
 
15 The distinction between geometric and topological features roughly tracks the one between exact and co-exact 




Figure 15. A diagram representing the Poincaré homology sphere 
 
This is significant.  Three-dimensional spaces cannot, in fact, be represented by 
something analogous to the sketches of surfaces – in order to see a three-dimensional space 
from the outside we would have to represent it in a four-dimensional space. The three-
dimensional analogues of arrow diagrams for surfaces, however, are not so well-behaved.  
When we interpret solids with oriented faces as three-dimensional spaces, we do not obtain 
manifolds exclusively but also orbifolds, which are topological spaces similar to manifolds that 
have singular points. 
Let us return to arrow diagrams for surfaces.  As we have seen, the fact that arrow 
diagrams can enter into the inferential structure of proofs can be explained by two facts: (i) 
they satisfy well-formedness conditions, and (ii) they are subject to precise rules of 
manipulation.  In this respect, diagrammatic systems are on all fours with other mathematical 
notational systems.16   It will be easier to think of physical instantiations of mathematical 
 
16 My discussion is an analysis of visual representations in the tradition inaugurated by Nelson Goodman’s (1976) 
Languages of art and developed by John Kulvicki (2003).  However, my analysis is distinct from theirs because I 
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notations.  We should keep in mind, however, that we can also imagine diagrams and other 
representations without inscribing them.  But what are mathematical notations?  I will not 
answer this question in all its generality.  Let me just remark that they are formed by elements, 
in our case, inscribed in a material medium that can be combined in different ways.  Not all 
perceptual features17 of such elements carry mathematical content; as a result, they are not all 
relevant for their interpretation.  It is helpful, then, to distinguish between perceptual features 
that are constitutive from perceptual features that are merely enabling.  For example, generally 
the color or width of the lines used in arrow diagrams or linear algebraic notations are merely 
enabling.  In those notations, they cannot carry mathematical content.  However, in the proof 
of the classification theorem, the zig-zagging has a specific mathematical meaning and is thus 
constitutive.  In the statement of the theorem, colors are also constitutive since they track the 
pairs of sides to be glued together – although the same information is also conveyed by the 
labels.  Crucially, the syntax of a notation cannot be altered by changing only enabling 
attributes. The partition of perceptual features of a notation into constitutive and enabling is 
 
work with mathematical notational systems, which have to satisfy more rigid constraints compared to other 
notational systems (and images more generally).  In this respect, it more related to works focusing on logical 
notations; see (Schlimm 2018). 
17 Even if I use the term perceptual features, in my analysis, I want to include diagrams that are merely imagined. In 




given by the interpretation, which also determines which manipulations are mathematically 
meaningful.18   
 Arrow diagrams are an example of diagrams that are not merely a subjective 
representation but form a mathematical notational system.  But further doubts concerning the 
legitimacy of diagrammatic systems in proofs could be raised.  Problems might arise, for 
instance, if some of the constitutive features of a diagram were too difficult to identify or 
reproduce reliably.  As I have argued in (De Toffoli Forthcoming), notations have to satisfy three 
basic constraints:  
 
1) a notation should be cognitively accessible: its constitutive perceptual features should 
be clearly identified, persistent, and stable; 
2) a notation should be reproducible: it should be possible for an average practitioner to 
copy its constitutive perceptual features with relative ease and reliability, possibly with 
the aid of different tools such as a straightedge and/or a computer; 
3) a notation should support calculations and/or inferences: it should be possible for an 




18 For an in-depth discussion of the distinction between enabling and constitutive features of mathematical 
notations see [obscured for blind review]. 
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In most cases of non-diagrammatic notations, such constraints are met as a matter of course.   
These constraints come in degrees. However, since we, as humans, share cognitive and 
perceptual limitations, there is a threshold that all notations have to meet in order to count as 
notations at all.  The fact that such constraints have often been left implicit may have 
contributed to skepticism via-à-vis the use of diagrams in proofs. 
As Kenneth Manders (2008) has discussed at length with respect to Euclidean geometry, 
if exact metric properties had been constitutive features of Euclidean diagrams, then ancient 
Greek geometric practice would not have gotten very far.  The resulting representations would 
not have been shareable and reproducible.  That is why such exact metric features were only 
available from the text. 19 
The fact that arrow diagrams form a genuine notation is reflected in the fact that they 
present an algebraic interpretation.20  We can label the edges of an arrow diagram in Figure 5 
and code it with the sequence, 𝑎!𝑏!𝑎!"!	𝑏!"!𝑎#𝑏#𝑎#"!	𝑏#"!…	  This can be useful, but 
transforming the diagrams into such algebraic words would obscure their topological meaning.  
The fact that arrow diagrams can be easily coded might give the impression that, after all, 
 
19 Inspired by Manders’ analysis of Euclidean diagrams, Brendan Larvor (2019) also spells out conditions that 
diagrams should satisfy to be used in proofs.  Mine are similar in spirit, but more general. See [obscured for blind 
review] for a comparison between the two. 
20 Similarly, Euclidean diagrams are used in systematic practices in a codified manner. Indeed, it is the possibility of 
codification that accounts for the existence of formal diagrammatic systems such as the one proposed by Avigad, 
Dean, and Mumma (2009) for Euclidean geometry. 
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diagrams are mere abbreviations of other forms of display.  But this is incorrect.  First, the two 
proofs include diagrams and not codes. Eliminating the diagrams without substituting them 
with other representations would leave the arguments incomplete.  That is, in those proofs, 
diagrams are not redundant.  Second, although it is true that diagrams might be replaced by 
algebraic codes, it is far from obvious that such replacement would preserve the original proof. 
Before proceeding to argue for this last claim (Section 3), it will be fruitful to consider another 
example of how diagrams are used in mathematics – one that will highlight to an even greater 
degree the similarities between diagrammatic and non-diagrammatic mathematical notations. 
 
2.4 ALGEBRAIC DIAGRAMS 
In the mid-twentieth century, after a long exile, diagrams began emerging once again in 
mathematical papers.  This is because new types of diagrams were introduced in the field of 
homological algebra, namely commutative diagrams.  I present an instance of a particular 
technique used extensively in this field: diagram chasing.21  The mathematical technicalities 
involved in explaining the technique need not scare the reader off.  What is important in what 
follows is not so much to have a firm grip on each mathematical detail but rather to form an 
idea of how these diagrams are used in proofs.   
 




Roughly, we begin with a commutative diagram made of nodes and arrows, such as the 
one in Figure 16 in which the nodes are abelian groups, and the arrows are group 
homomorphisms.22 
 
Figure 16. A Commutative Diagram 
 
The fact that a diagram is commutative means that if we want to connect two nodes, it 
does not matter which arrows we follow: any two paths leading from the same starting point to 
the same endpoint are equivalent – in other words, the journey is precisely not the goal.  For 
example, if we wish to connect 𝑀’ to 𝑁 in Figure 17, it makes no difference if we go right and 
down following arrows 𝑓$% and 𝑑 or down and right following arrows 𝑑’ and 𝑓&%.  Our goal will 
be to prove certain properties of the maps in a diagram (i.e., the arrows).  If we focus on a given 
node, we can choose a specific element, say 𝑚’ in 𝑀’.  The technique of diagram chasing 
consists in moving such an element around the diagram by transforming it following the 
arrows, for example, moving 𝑚’ along the arrow 𝑓$% and transforming it into the element 𝑚 of 
 




the group 𝑀 (where 𝑚 = 𝑓$%(𝑚’)).  That is, we transform a given element belonging to one 
group in a node of the diagram by applying the homomorphisms corresponding to the arrows.  
Each “0” in this diagram denotes a group with sole member its identity element. This is a 
customary abuse of notation. In the text “0” denotes the identity of a group; additive notation 
is used. 
We say that a row of a commutative diagram is exact if, in that row, the image of one 
arrow is the kernel of the next. The kernel of an arrow (or, more generally, of a 
homomorphism) is the inverse image of 0.   That is, it is the set of all the elements that are sent 
to O.  Saying that the first raw of Figure 16 is exact means two things: (1) Im	𝑓$% = Ker	𝑔$ and 
(2) Im	𝑔$ = M′′, this is because, by definition, the kernel of a homomorphism that sends all 
elements to 0 is the whole domain of that homeomorphism.   
One last definition is needed. The cokernel of an arrow is the quotient of its co-domain 
over its image. For example, looking at Figure 16, we have: Coker	𝑑% = 𝑁%/	Im	𝑑%.  
I now present a passage of the famous Snake Lemma (named after the shape of the 
diagram it involves).  In an introductory book on homological algebra, Charles A. Weibel 
writes:23 
 
We will not print the proof of the Snake lemma in these notes, because it is best done 
visually. In fact, a clear proof is given by Jill Clayburgh at the beginning of the movie ‘It’s 
My Turn.’ (1994, 11) 
 




Although I certainly agree that it is much easier to convey how the diagram chasing technique 
works with a live performance, the best I can do here is report a short passage of the proof. 
 
THE SNAKE LEMMA. Given the commutative diagram of abelian groups in Figure 17 in 
which the rows are exact, we can define the map: 
𝛿:	𝐾𝑒𝑟	𝑑%% → 𝐶𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟	𝑑’ 
with 𝛿(𝑧%%) = ℎ ∘ 	𝑓&!
"! ∘ 	𝑑 ∘ 	𝑔$"!, where ℎ:𝑁% → Coker	𝑑′ maps 𝑛′ to 𝑛′ + Im	𝑑′.  And 
we get the following exact sequence: 
𝐾𝑒𝑟(𝑑%) → 	𝐾𝑒𝑟(𝑑) → 𝐾𝑒𝑟(𝑑%%) → 	𝐶𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑑%) → 𝐶𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑑) → 𝐶𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟(𝑑%%)	
	
 
Figure 17. The Snake Lemma 
 
The lemma is proved by diagram chasing.  Each row is exact: the image of one arrow is 
the kernel of the next, e.g., Im	𝑓$% = Ker	𝑔$.  All rectangles commute.  Figure 18 is an 




Figure 18. Extended diagram of the Snake Lemma 
 
In this extended diagram, 𝑔∗: Ker	𝑑 → Ker	𝑑%% is just 𝑔$ restricted to Ker	𝑑 (that is, it is 
the map induced by 𝑔	on the kernels).  The winding dashed arrow from Ker	𝑑%% to 
Coker	𝑑% represents the intended function 𝛿.  The downward arrows from the kernels 
are identity functions (Ker	𝑑% is the set of 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀’ that 𝑑% maps to 0&; similarly for 𝑑	and 
𝑑%%).  Coker	𝑑% = 𝑁%/	Im	𝑑%	is the group of cosets of Im	𝑑% in 𝑁%	(Im	𝑑′	𝑖𝑠	𝑑	′[𝑀′]). The 
downward arrow to the cokernel of 𝑑′ maps 𝑛′ to 𝑛% + Im	𝑑′; similarly for 𝑑 and 𝑑′′.  
The middle two rows are exact, and all rectangles commute.   
Following (Lang 2002), I report only one step of the proof. However, I will prove 
this step in a much more detailed way, so as to make the argument intelligible to 
anyone with knowledge of basic group theory, and to give some indication (in square 
brackets) of how it involves a chase around the diagram.  Such information would 
normally be conveyed easily in a live lecture. 
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This has to be the case because of the exactness of the long exact sequence in the 
statement of the lemma (in fact, the strongest relation	Ker	𝛿 = Im	𝑔∗ must hold).  Facts 
from basic group theory are assumed without mention. Diagram chasing moves are 
indicated by comments in square brackets. 
  
ONE STEP OF THE PROOF 
Let 𝑧’’ be any member of Ker	𝛿.  By exactness 𝑔$:𝑀 → 𝑀′′ is surjective (as the final 
arrow 𝑀%% → 0 has kernel the whole of 𝑀%%).  So Im	𝑔$ = 	𝑀′′. Now, 𝑧%% ∈ Ker	𝑑%% ⊆ 𝑀%% 
(given).  So 𝑧%% = 𝑔$(𝑧) for some 𝑧 ∈ 𝑀. 
 
Figure 19. Diagram Chasing  
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Now, [A] we choose one such 𝑧 ∈ 𝑀. [We move backwards along 𝑔$ 
transforming 𝑧′′ into 𝑧, see Figure 19.]  As 𝑧%% ∈ Ker	𝑑%%, 0 = 𝑑′′(𝑧′′) = 𝑑′′(𝑔$ 	(𝑧)) =
𝑔&	(𝑑(𝑧)) by commutativity (right middle rectangle).  So 𝑑(𝑧) ∈ Ker	𝑔& = Im	𝑓&% by 
exactness. So, [B] for a unique 𝑧% ∈ 𝑁%, 𝑑(𝑧) = 𝑓&%(𝑧′). It is unique because 𝑓&% is 
injective, (as the initial arrow 0 → 𝑁′ has image {0} = Ker	𝑓&% by exactness). [We move 
down along 𝑑 turning 𝑧 into 𝑑(𝑧) and then left.]  
Now “define” 𝛿(𝑧′′) = 𝑧′ + Im	𝑑′. Why the scare quotes? Because 𝑧′ is defined 
in terms of 𝑧, where 𝑧 is just one choice from 𝑔$"!	(𝑧′′) [see A].  So, we need to show 
that a different choice from 𝑔$"!	(𝑧′′), say 𝑧(, would make no difference, i.e., that 𝑧′ +
Im	𝑑′	 = 	 𝑧(% + Im	𝑑′. This holds and we can remove the scare quotes. For brevity we 
skip the argument.24,25  
As 𝑧%% ∈ Ker	𝛿, we also have 𝛿(𝑧′′) =	0 in Coker	𝑑′ = 𝑁%/	Im	𝑑′.  So 𝑧′ +
	Im	𝑑′ = 𝛿(𝑧′′) = Im	𝑑′. Hence 𝑧% ∈ Im	𝑑′; that is, [C] 𝑧′ = 𝑑′(𝑢′), for some 𝑢′ in 𝑀′. 
Choose one such 𝑢′ – it does not matter which. 
We now connect 𝑢′ in the top left corner of the left middle rectangle to 𝑑(𝑧) in 
its bottom right corner in two ways, to get a useful identity: 𝑑(𝑓$!(𝑢′)) = 𝑓&!(𝑑′(𝑢′)) 
by commutativity it is equal to 	𝑓&%	(𝑧%) = 𝑑(𝑧) [see B, C]. 
 
24 Up to this point 𝑧” can be any member of the domain of 𝛿, as the argument so far does not use the stipulation 
that 𝑧” ∈ Ker	𝛿. 
25 We have in effect defined 𝛿 as ℎ ∘	𝑓"!
#$ ∘ 	𝑑 ∘ 	𝑔%#$ , where ℎ:𝑁& → Coker	𝑑′ maps 𝑛′ to 𝑛′ + Im	𝑑′. 
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So 0 = 𝑑(𝑧) − 𝑑(𝑓$! 	(𝑢′)) = 𝑑(𝑧 − (𝑓$! 	(𝑢′)).  So 𝑧 − (𝑓$!(𝑢%)) ∈ Ker	𝑑. [We 
reverse up 𝑑, from 𝑑(𝑧 − V𝑓$!(𝑢%)W)	𝑡𝑜	𝑧 − (𝑓$!(𝑢′), in order to move right along 𝑔∗]. 
Recall 𝑔∗ = 𝑔$ 	|	Ker	𝑑.		So	𝑔∗(𝑧 − 𝑓$!(𝑢′)) = 𝑔$(𝑧 − 𝑓$!(𝑢′)) = 𝑔$(𝑧) −
𝑔$(𝑓$!(𝑢′)). And 𝑓$%	(𝑢%) ∈ Im	𝑓$! = Ker	𝑔$ by exactness; so 𝑔$(𝑓$!(𝑢′)) = 0.  So 
𝑔∗(𝑧 − 𝑓$!(𝑢′)) = 𝑔$(𝑧) [previous two lines], = 	𝑧′′ [See A].  So 𝑧%% ∈ Im	𝑔∗.  As 𝑧′′is an 
arbitrary member of Ker	𝛿, Ker	𝛿 ⊆ Im	𝑔∗.26 
QED 
 
As mentioned above, the presentation above is much longer than one we would find in 
a mathematics textbook or journal article.  Many of the moves presented here as symbol 
manipulations are recognized immediately by practitioners from looking at the diagram, such as 
the identities established by commutativity of rectangles and exactness of rows. 
Any presentation of this proof will make an appeal to exactness and to commutativity, 
and when such appeals are made one needs to attend to the diagram to check that the 
identities claimed are in fact justified by those appeals. This point reveals that the visual 
thinking supported by the diagram involved in following the argument plays a much larger part 
than might appear, especially in relation to the expansive text. Moreover, visual thinking, where 
this includes both visually perceiving a diagram and visually imagining moves around the 
diagram, is essential to follow this argument. 
 
26 Thanks are due to [obscured for blind review] for helping me to make this proof more accessible and in clarifying 
its philosophical importance. 
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What is not revealed by following a diagram-chasing argument on its own is its cognitive 
efficiency relative to the mountain of pure symbol-manipulation involved in following a 
diagram-free counterpart of the argument.  One needs to compare following the diagram 
chasing argument with a diagram-free counterpart. Of course, one can follow a diagram-free 
counterpart stepwise, given sufficient indication of the prior information that is drawn on when 
inferring a new line; but one may still be in the dark about how individual steps contribute to 
larger sections of the argument and how these sections fit together, because the torchlight of 
attention tends to be focused narrowly on the individual steps. It is much easier to keep track of 
what is going on when following the diagram-chasing argument, because attention to the 
diagram itself induces us to zoom out from individual steps (as well as to check identities based 
on exactness or commutativity). This relative cognitive efficiency applies not only to following 
an argument but also to discovering an argument. This becomes clearer as one becomes more 
practiced. It is true that different mathematicians have different preferences and modes of 
thinking, nevertheless, eliminating the diagrams from diagrams chasing arguments would 
inevitably introduce some cognitive challenges.27  
 
 
27 Thanks to one of the anonymous referees for this point. 
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3. DIAGRAMS THAT ARE NOT ABBREVIATIONS 
If there were lingering doubts about whether diagrams can form notational systems, the 
example of commutative diagrams should have dispelled them.  Proofs by diagram chasing 
show that diagrams do not necessarily threaten the validity of proofs.28 
It is now time to tackle the second issue raised by Burgess: are all diagrams, which are 
not mere illustrations, just abbreviations of more cumbersome linguistic expressions?  The 
answer is: No.  It is true that diagrams can always be coded into linear displays.  Not only can 
any digital image be encapsulated into a sequence of bytes and bits, but diagrams forming 
notations, which are discrete objects with a finite number of well-identifiable constitutive 
features, can be coded with system-specific encodings.  For example, codes formed by algebraic 
words can be used for arrow diagrams for surfaces like the one in Figure 5(a), which is coded 
with the sequence 𝑎!𝑏!𝑎!"!	𝑏!"!𝑎#𝑏#𝑎#"!	𝑏#"!… .  Crucially, however, if we are supposed to 
leave the proof invariant when substituting diagrams with non-diagrammatic expressions, then 
it might be harder or outright impossible to eliminate diagrams.  And if it is impossible, 
diagrams would be essential for that proof.  This can happen in two distinct ways. 
Diagrams are trivially indispensable to the proofs in formal diagrammatic systems.  Sun-
Joo Shin (1994) proved that Venn-II, a diagrammatic system she developed starting from Venn 
 
28 See [obscured for blind review] for a characterization and taxonomy of mathematical diagrams. 
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diagrams, is sound, complete, and equivalent to a system of monadic first-order logic.  It is a 
tautology that, without diagrams, a formal diagrammatic system could not exist.29   
The second way in which diagrams can be essential to proofs is at once subtler and 
more widespread.  Diagrams can be essential without being indispensable inferential resources 
– that is, even if it is still possible to prove without them all results that are provable with them.  
They can still be essential in certain proofs in the sense that any diagram-free proof of the same 
result would be a different proof.  This case requires a lengthier discussion, one that can offer 
guidelines for adjudicating between cases in which two proofs are the same and ones in which 
they are different. 
 
3.1 CRITERIA OF IDENTITY FOR PROOFS 
Proofs are abstract objects.  They can be considered equivalence classes of proof presentations.  
However, it is not always clear which equivalence relation is appropriate.  At one extreme, we 
could consider all proofs of the same result to be equivalent.  But this coarse-grained way of 
individuating proofs would be inappropriate to study mathematical practice. For instance, the 
common practice of proving the same result in multiple ways would be unintelligible. 
Therefore, we should look for a more fine-grained criterion.  As Marcus Giaquinto suggests, 
 




proof presentations containing the same “central idea” are generally considered to be 
equivalent, but  
 
[…] if one’s main concern is with what is involved in thinking through a proof, its central 
idea is not enough to individuate it: the overall structure, the sequence of steps and 
perhaps other factors affecting the cognitive processes involved will be relevant. (2008, 
24, emphasis added). 
 
There might be no fact of the matter about whether two presentations present the same proof 
or different proofs.  Timothy Gowers, a Fields medalist, admits in his popular blog that it was 
not only difficult to sharply characterize what it means for a proof to satisfy informal 
characterizations such as being explanatory, but “even the seemingly more basic question, 
‘When are two proofs the same?’ was pretty hard to answer satisfactorily.”  It is plausible to 
think that there are no context-independent identity conditions for proofs.30   
 
30 This is also in line with (Dawson 2006). Note that there might be canonical criteria of identity for formal proofs.  
These, however, would not easily generalize to traditional proofs. 
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Criteria of identity for proofs are, in fact, determined only in a specific context of 
investigation.31  More precisely, what has to be established to determine the criteria of 
individuation of a proof is the main concern or purpose for which individuation is required.32  
For example, in one context, rigor may be the major concern; in that context, a presentation 
that makes totally explicit the assumptions, definitions and logical steps on which the argument 
depends presents a distinct proof from an informal exposition of the first.33  But if the major 
concern is not about rigor but about purity,34 hence about what mathematical concepts are 
involved, the degree of informality may count as a mere matter of presentation and so a fully 
explicit presentation and an informal exposition could present the same proof.35  
In the present context of investigation, the main concern is with the epistemic and 
cognitive benefits and drawbacks for someone working through a proof.  In particular, 
 
31 Similarly, one could ask whether two performances are performances of the same symphony. Although the 
score is often recognized as what fixes the identity of musical pieces, how much variation is allowed will depend on 
the interest of the social group. This is a complex issue; see for example (Goehr 2003). 
32  Note that the same individual or the same group of individuals can have different purposes in different times. 
What matters is the specific context of investigation. 
33 Note however that Jody Azzouni (2013) has argued that diagrammatic proofs can be “perfectly rigorous.”  
34 See (Arana and Mancosu 2015) for a discussion of purity in the context of mathematics. 
35 Mathematicians can have two or even more concerns at the same time.  For example, searching for a purely 
analytic proof of the Intermediate Value Theorem, Bolzano wanted to achieve both purity and rigor; see (Detlefsen 
2008b; Kitcher 1975). I am thankful to one of the anonymous referees for this observation.  My point is simply that 
privileging one concern over another might lead to the choice of different criteria of identity of proofs.  
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understanding the argument, in the sense of having a grasp of what motivates the major lines 
of argument, so that the large-scale structure of the argument comes into view, is a major 
epistemic benefit.  And cognitive efficiency, in the sense of the ease of working through the 
argument, is another significant benefit.  For example, it works against efficiency if, in order to 
see why steps are valid, one has to hold in mind a heavy load of formulas on which later steps 
may depend, or to search back frequently to find the immediate premisses on which steps 
depend. Therefore, in this context, if one proof-presentation is significantly better than another 
with regard to cognitive-epistemic pros and cons for someone working through them, the 
proofs presented are distinct proofs. This holds even if one of the presentations is obtained 
from the other by replacing all diagrams with non-diagrammatic encodings. 
Let us consider the cases of arrow diagrams for surfaces discussed above.  Imagine 
substituting all diagrams with algebraic codes in the proof of the classification theorem for 
surfaces presented in (Massey 1991), a step of which is reported in Section 2.1.  We can 
perform such a substitution to represent the diagrammatic moves represented in Figure 6 – 
which I re-inserted here as Figure 20 for ease of comparison. 
 
 




I will code the diagrams starting with their left edge and using Z as a convention for the 
zig-zag notation that, as we saw above, is used to introduce generality into the diagrammatic 
representations. Start with the surface aZbZa-1Zb-1Z, now cut it so as to separate the surface 
ZbZ with c, a new edge (this is the first diagram), and glue the two new surfaces along b.  We 
obtain Zac-1a-1Zc (second diagram).   Now, cut as to separate Za (third diagram) introducing the 
new edge d. We get dc-1d-1Zc, which is equivalent to cdc-1d-1Z – which is part of the general 
pattern for orientable surfaces.  This brief presentation with algebraic words does not involve 
any diagram, but, as a matter of fact, in order to go through it and recognize it as valid, a 
mathematician would generally recreate (in the paper or mentally) arrow diagrams similar to 
the ones in Figure 20.  There is, however, an alternative. We can spell out rules of 
manipulations of the algebraic codes themselves that correspond to the rules of manipulation 
of the diagrams. After listing such rules, we could check the correctness of the diagram-free 
proof without having to invoke any diagram whatsoever.  But in this case, the diagram-free 
proof presentation does not present the same proof as the diagrammatic proof presentation. 
This is because the two presentations differ with regard to epistemic and cognitive benefits and 
drawbacks. The diagrammatic proof-presentation requires the reader to visualize specific 
spatial manipulations and recognize their validity.  The diagram-free proof does no such thing.  
It is not only much easier to go through the diagrammatic argument, but it also allows us to 
grasp the proof more vividly.  Moreover, the very subject-matter of the two presentations 
differs: one is about surfaces, represented with arrow diagrams in an intuitive way, and the 
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other is about algebraic words, which represent surfaces only indirectly.  Arrow diagrams are 
needed to transition from algebraic words to surfaces since the words are codes for the 
diagrams and not for the surfaces themselves. 
One could concede that this is true but downplay the importance of such a result by 
pointing at the fact that, after all, if we prove things about geometric or topological objects, it is 
not surprising that proofs involving geometric or topological representations would stand out 
compared to ones that do not involve them.  There is a twofold answer to this complaint.  First, 
the matter is not whether a result is or is not surprising, but rather whether it is true.  Our 
question was: Can diagrams be essential to proofs? The example of the classification theorem 
for mathematical diagrams shows that the affirmative response is correct.  Second, it is also 
possible to use the case of commutative diagrams, which are rarely about geometric or 
topological objects, to make the same point. Let us do that now. 
The step of the proof of the Snake Lemma I presented invokes commutative diagrams.  
Once again, if we convert the proof into a diagram-free counterpart, a mathematician would 
generally reconstruct for herself the diagram in order to go through it.36  Without the diagrams 
it is much, much harder to grasp the large-scale structure of the proof and what motivated the 
various steps.  The diagrams represent in a compact and surveyable way the algebraic situation. 
They allow mathematicians to identify viable proof strategies.  Moreover, also for small-scale 
grasping, diagrams play a key role. They allow the reader to have a place to return to in order to 
 
36 Even when we implement or check a formally verified version of the Snake Lemma, we normally need to 
reconstruct the diagrams (again, either in paper or mentally).   
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check whether the algebraic manipulations are correct.  Are those the right indices? Is it n or 
n’? What is the image of x under f?  That the particular reasoning at play would change without 
the diagrams is also supported by the fact that, in jargon, it is common to refer to diagram 
chasing as a mathematical technique and as the hallmark of certain proofs.  We need a diagram 
to perform the technique of diagram chasing!   
 
4. CONCLUSION 
Let me sum up the considerations of the previous paragraphs. In the case of proofs by diagram 
chasing, the diagrams are needed to grasp the large-scale structure of the proof and to help us 
carry out symbolic manipulations by not having the burden of holding all indices in mind. In 
proofs by cutting and pasting arrow diagrams for surfaces, the diagrams enable us to use 
visualization in a rigorous way – it is this visualization that makes the diagrammatic proofs 
clearer and easier to verify.  So, any transformation of the arrow-diagrams proof of the 
Classification Theorem for surfaces and the commutative-diagrams proof of the Snake Lemma 
into non-diagrammatic proofs will result in a significant loss of epistemic and cognitive benefits 
for anyone working through those proofs.  
From the perspective of mathematical practice, a significant difference in the overall 
epistemic and cognitive advantages of presented proofs for working through them entails that 
the proofs themselves are different. This holds even if they have the same informational 
content.  Therefore, from the perspective of mathematical practice, diagrams in the proofs of 
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the Classification Theorem for surfaces and the Snake Lemma discussed earlier are essential to 
those proofs.  
To return to the initial skepticism expressed by Burgess, while some illustrations are 
perhaps “no more essential to the proofs in whose midst they appear than the illustrations that 
accompanied many Victorian novels on first publication were essential to the literary value of 
those works,” this is in general not true for diagrams.  Michael Detlefsen recognized this, in 
addition to recognizing the growing importance of diagrams in philosophy of mathematics: 
 
[T]he growing body of work on diagrammatic reasoning is of [...] great interest and 
potential. It challenges the traditional ideas concerning the role of diagrammatic 
reasoning in proof and the development of mathematical knowledge more generally. It 
suggests, in particular, that diagrammatic reasoning has a justificative and not merely a 
heuristic role to play in proof. Much interesting work has already been done in this 
direction, and more is sure to follow. (2008, 28) 
 
In this essay, my goal has been to bring us a bit further in this direction.  
 
REFERENCES 
Arana, Andrew, and Paolo Mancosu. 2015. “Plane and Solid Geometry: A Note on Purity of 
Methods.” In From Logic to Practice, edited by G. Lolli, M. Panza, and G. Venturi, 23–31. 
Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science. Springer. 
Avigad, Jeremy, Edward Dean, and John Mumma. 2009. “A Formal System for Euclid’s 
Elements.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (04): 700–768. 
43 
 
Azzouni, Jody. 2013. “That We See That Some Diagrammatic Proofs Are Perfectly Rigorous.” 
Philosophia Mathematica 21 (3): 323–38. 
Burgess, John P. 2015. Rigor and Structure. Oxford University Press. 
Camp, Elisabeth. 2007. “Thinking with Maps.” Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1): 145–82. 
Carter, Jessica. 2019a. “Exploring the Fruitfulness of Diagrams in Mathematics.” Synthese 196: 
4011–32. 
———. 2019b. “Philosophy of Mathematical Practice—Motivation, Themes and Prospects.” 
Philosophia Mathematica 27 (1): 1–32. 
Chemla, Karine. 2018. “The Proof Is in the Diagram: Liu Yi and the Graphical Writing of Algebraic 
Equations in Eleventh-Century China.” Endeavour, Tools of Reason: The Practice of 
Scientific Diagramming from Antiquity to the Present, 42 (2): 60–77. 
Davidson, Donald. 1978. “What Metaphors Mean.” Critical Inquiry 1 (5): 31–47. 
Dawson, John W., Jr. 2006. “Why Do Mathematicians Re-Prove Theorems?” Philosophia 
Mathematica 14 (3): 269–86. https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkl009. 
De Toffoli, Silvia. 2017. “`Chasing’ the Diagram - The Use of Visualizations in Algebraic 
Reasoning.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 10 (1): 158–86. 
———. Forthcoming. “What Are Mathematical Diagrams?” Synthese. 
De Toffoli, Silvia, and Valeria Giardino. 2014. “Roles and Forms of Diagrams in Knot Theory.” 
Erkenntnis 79 (3): 829–42. 
Detlefsen, Michael. 2008a. “Proof: Its Nature and Significance.” In Proofs and Other Dilemmas: 
Mathematics and Philosophy, edited by Bonnie Gold and Roger A. Simons, 3–32. 
Spectrum. 
———. 2008b. “Purity as an Ideal of Proof.” In The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice, edited 
by P. Mancosu, 179–97. Oxford University Press. 
Feferman, Solomon. 2012. “And so on...: Reasoning with Infinite Diagrams.” Synthese 186 (1): 
371–86. 
Ferreirós, José. 2016. Mathematical Knowledge and the Interplay of Practices. Princeton 
University Press. 
Francis, George K., and Jeffrey R. Weeks. 1999. “Conway’s ZIP Proof.” The American 
Mathematical Monthly 106 (5): 393–99. 
Giaquinto, Marcus. 2007. Visual Thinking in Mathematics. Oxford University Press. 
———. 2008. “Visualizing in Mathematics.” In The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice, edited 
by P. Mancosu, 22–42. Oxford University Press. 
Goehr, Lydia. 2003. The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of 
Music. Oxford University Press. 
Goodman, Nelson. 1976. Languages of Art. Second. Hackett Publishing Company. 
Hahn, Hans. 1980. “The Crisis in Intuition.” In Empiricism, Logic and Mathematics, 73–102. 
Springer. 
Kitcher, Philip. 1975. “Bolzano’s Ideal of Algebraic Analysis.” Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science Part A 6 (3): 229–69. 
Kulvicki, John V. 2003. “Image Structure.” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 61 (4): 323–40. 
Lang, Serge. 2002. Algebra. Revised third. Springer. 
44 
 
Larvor, Brendan. 2019. “From Euclidean Geometry to Knots and Nets.” Synthese 196 (7): 2715–
36. 
Mancosu, Paolo, ed. 2008. The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice. Oxford University Press. 
Manders, Kenneth. 2008. “The Euclidean Diagram.” In The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice, 
edited by P. Mancosu, 80–133. Oxford University Press. 
Massey, William S. 1991. A Basic Course in Algebraic Topology. Springer. 
Netz, Reviel. 1998. “Greek Mathematical Diagrams: Their Use and Their Meaning.” For the 
Learning of Mathematics, 33–39. 
———. 1999. The Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics: A Study in Cognitive History. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Poincaré, Henri. 1900. “Deuxième Complément à l’analysis Situs.” Proc. Lond. Math. Soc. 32: 
45–110. 
Schlimm, Dirk. 2018. “On Frege’s Begriffsschrift Notation for Propositional Logic: Design 
Principles and Trade-Offs.” History and Philosophy of Logic 39 (1): 53–79. 
Shin, Sun-Joo. 1994. The Logical Status of Diagrams. Cambridge University Press. 
Weibel, Charles A. 1994. Introduction to Homological Algebra. Cambridge University Press. 
 
